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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

ELISEO J.

~I ...~RES,

JR.,
Plaintiff,

v.
~1 ...-\SON

\"V. HILL, Warden of the

Case No.
735·3

Utah State Penitentiary,
Defendant.

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF .

STATEMENT OF FACTS
It was stipulated at the hearing before the Special
Referee, by the parties hereto, that the original files,
records, or·ders, transcripts .and proceedings of the Pre-.
liminary Hearing before the Honorable William H.
Chappell, Justice's Court, Coalville Precinct, and all
proceedings in the District C.ourt in Case No. 420 entitled State of Utah vs. Eliseo J. Mares, Jr., and all
records, orders, petitions and briefs filed in the Supreme Court in the same ·case No. 7092 ·criminal, be the
factual evidence in the ~ase, plus any other stipulation
proposed and agreed to by the parties hereto. (Transcript of hearing before Referee p. 30-34 incl., 36 and 37.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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From the foregoing records, proceedings, files and
stipulations, the following statement of facts is apropos:
(Records, etc. referred to in this brief are denorninated in the following manner: Transcript of Preliminary Hearing (PT); ·Transcript of District Court case
(R); Amended Findings of the Special Referee (AF).
1. The plaintiff, Eliseo J. Mares, Jr., was born
November 26, 1927, at Crowley, Colorado. In his early
youth the family moved to Antonito, Colorado, where
his father was a deputy sheriff for many years. On
November 29, 1945, at the age of eighteen years, plaintiff was inducted into the United States Army. On or
about April 29, 1946, while stationed at Gieger Field,
Spokane, Washington, plaintiff absented himself without leave from the army and returned to his home at
Antonito, Colorado, to see his wife and newly born baby.
On his return to Antonito his father advised him to
return immediately to his station at· Gieger Field in
Washington. On his way back to his .army station,
plaintiff took a 1937 Packard sedan automobile with a
New York license plate from a parking lot near the bus
depot at Denver, Colorado, and started north on Highway No. 85 toward Wyoming. He drove west on U. S.
Highway No. 30 toward Utah. During this trill' he
picked up two soldiers who were hitchhiking near Laramie; Wyoming. He found a 32 caliber automatic pistol
in the glove compartment of the Packard sedan. He
put the pistol in his suit case, noting at the time that
the clip contained six steel-jacketed bullets. He conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tinued 'vest on U ..s. Highway No. 30 until he reached a
place about seven n1iles east of Sinclair, Wyoming. At
this point the Packard sedan developed' motor trouble
and broke the connecting rod. The soldiers who had been
riding with him left in another car and the Packard was
later towed into Sinclair by John C. Bennett, a garage
man in that town. Plaintiff was told by the garage
mechanic that the Packard could not be repaired and
that it would be necessary to install a new motor. About
a half hour after he arrived at the garage, on Sunday,
June 23, 1946, plaintiff noticed a 1937 gray Ford tudor sedan being towed into the garage. The driver was
Jack Derwood Stallings, the person whose death is the.
basis of the murder charge filed against plaintiff. The
plaintiff became acquainted with Stallings. They ate
dinner together and Stallings told plaintiff that he
would give him a ride to Ogden, Utah, if he would help
him repair his Ford. 'They both slept in their cars in the
garage. That night there were ten or twelve other cars
stored in the garage with the keys left in the ignition
lock so the cars could be moved at anytime. The cars
belonged to patrons of the hotel. No one else stayed in
the garage except plaintiff and Stallings throughout
the night. There was a rear door to the garage with a
latch on the inside which could be opened by anyone
on the inside of the garage. On Monday morni~g plaintiff loaned Stallings $15.00 to buy parts for his Ford.
At that time Stallings told plaintiff that he would have
some money sent to him to Ogden and would pay him
back. They worked on the car until noon Monday. They
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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then went over to the hotel where the plaintiff purchased a quart of whiskey from the liquor store located
in the hotel. They both had a good drink of liquor before eating and had another after they finished their
luncheon. They then went back to the garage, got in
Stallings' car and started west on Highway No. 30.
They had only gone a few miles when car trouble developed and they were towe·d into Rawlins, Wyoming.
They _stayed in Rawlins approximately two hours repairing the Ford. They purchased a fuel pump from
Pat Chaffin who operated the Ford garage at Rawlins.
They drank some more of the whiskey between :Sinclair
and Rawlins. Mr. Chaffin testified that plaintiff had a
smell of fresh whiskey on his breath at the time he sold
him the fuel pump; that he did not get close enough to
Mr. Stallings. to ascertain· if he had been drinking.
Plaintiff went with Jack Stallings to the telegraph office where Jack sent a telegram to a girl friend in San
Jose,- California, requesting that she send him thirty
dollars in care of Western Union at Ogden, Utah. They
left Rawlins at app~roximately 5:00 o'clock P.M. Between Rawlins. and Little America they had considerable
trouble with the Ford car on account of vapor-lock. At
Little _America they bought a hand pump in order to
pump out the fuel line. They also bought another bottle
of whiskey. They had finished drinking the quart which
they purchased at Sinclair before they arrived at Little
America. They also ate dinner at Little America. Between Little America and Evanston they each fired
two shots from the· 32. pistol which plaintiff obtained
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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from the glove c.ompartment of the Packard auton1obile,
leaving two shells in the eli'p. They continued to have
trouble with the Ford car between Little America and
Evanston. It \vas necessary to blow out the fuel line
a nmnber of times before they reached Evanston. The
bottle of whiskey which they purchased at Little America was nearly consumed between that point and Evanston and there was only a small amount left in the bottle
when they left Evanston. They had trouble with the
Ford when they arrived at Evanston and while Stallings
'vas attempting to repair the same the p~laintiff walked
down the street to see if he could steal a car. He saw
a man park a car and leave the ignition key in the lock.
He then went back and reported to Stallings that they
could steal that car. Stallings had fixed his own car by
that time. Stallings put his identification bracelet and
ring in the glove compartment of the car while he went
in to wash his hands and plaintiff stayed in the car with
the motor idling. They left Evanston after midnight
Monday and continued their trip toward Ogden. At that
time plaintiff had had too much to drink and was sleepy
and he went to sleep. Stallings drove the car when they
left Evanston. (R. 503-541)
2. From this point in the case the evidence as submitted by the State differs from that offered by the
plaintiff in support of his defense. The State relied
principally upon the testimony of P. H. Neeley, the
Cownty Atto~rney of Summit County. Stallings drove
the car from Evanston down to the Utah State line.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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When he arrived at that point he awakened plaintiff and
told him they were entering Utah. He -continued to
drive the car down Echo Canyon to a point approximately one and a quarter miles west of E-cho. Neeley
testified : ''I asked Mr. Mares when he conceived doing
this. He said he had been thinking about it on the trip.
He said when Mr. Stallings drove the ear over the UtahWyoming line that Mr. Stallings woke Mr. Mares up.
Mr. Mares at that time he said, Mr. Mares said, at that
time he was -sleeping in the back seat of the car, and he
said Stallings said : 'We are entering Utah.' Mares
then opened his suitcase, changed his shirt, took the gun
and laid it on the side of the back seat, and said that he
made up his !flind to kill Stallings and take that car
coming down Echo Canyon." (R. 338) Neeley further
testified that Mares told him when they got down to a
point approximately one and a quarter miles past the
town of Echo, Stallings pulled off the side of the road
for the purpose of resting and when Stallings got out
of the ,car on the right-hand side of the car and was looking down at the tire or his shoe laces, and without any
quarreling of any kind or any p·remonition of what.was
going to happen, the plaintiff took the pistol which he
obtained from the glove compartment of the Packard
automobile, reached his arm tl;lrough the back window
and while Stallings was in a stooped position and without any warning whatsoever, fired ~a shot into Stallings'
head; that Stallings fell to the ground; t})at plaintiff got
out of the car, picked up the lifeless body, put it in the
seat of the car and put Stallings' jacket over the head;
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that plaintiff then backed the car out and turned it
around and drove back up Echo Canyon to the junction
of High"~ay No. 30 with the road that leads south to
Coalville; that he went through the underpass, drove
the car down through Coalville, and when he got to the
little town of Hoytsville at what is known as Judd Hill
the car stopped; that there were cars passing hy and
he was afraid someone would discover the dead body
of Stallings in the car, so he took the body out and ·put
it in the canal; that the plaintiff then p:roceeded down
Parley's Canyon into Salt Lake County; from there ·he
went to Immigration Canyon where he threw away the
gun, Stallings' clothes and Stallings' identification
bracelet and ring which he found in the glove comp,artment; that he continued to Ogden where he sold the car
to Iver J. Wistisen for $425.00 and a bicycle which was
in the trunk for $6.00; that plaintiff and Wistisen went
to the Desk Sergeant of the O·gden Police Department,
who notarized the plaintiff's forged signature of Jack
Stallings on the title paper~ to the automobile. He also
went to the Western Union Telegraph Station· and received $30.00 which Stallings' girl friend had s~nt to
him in answer to his telegraphic request sent from Rawlins; that plaintiff represented to the officials of the
Western Union that he was Jack Derwood Stallings in
obtaining the $30.00; that plaintiff then left Ogden and
returned about a month later when he was recognized on
the streets by Wistisen, who reported to the Ogden
police and the plaintiff was arrested. The State called
~lRS. G·LADYS RICHINS JONES as its witness. ·M.rs.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Jones lives on the Echo Canyon Road about two city
blocks east of the point of the alle_ged killing of Stallings.
She testified that in the latter part of June, to-wit, around
the 23rd or 24th of the month, she was awakened in th~
early hours of the morning by a car travelling west on
the road in front of their home; that she heard a man
crying for help as the car proceeded down to the point
of the alleged slaying. When the car stopped she heard
a voice say, "don't, don't, don't do it"; then she heard
a shot and after a pe·riod of quiet the car hacked up and
turned around and went back up the road past her home;
she got to the window just after the shot was fired;
she saw the car turn back onto the road and travel back
east past her home toward the town of Echo. This
witness was subpoenred by the State at the preliminary
hearing but was excused and the plaintiff called her as
his witness. At the trial Mrs. Jones. was subpoenaed
as the plaintiff'·s witness but the State called her as its·
own witness. Mrs. Jones reported this occurrence to
the police officials long before plaintiff was arrested
and before the plaintiff disclosed any information as to
his movements both before and after the death of
Stallings. (R. 399-408; 436-451)
3. The defense relied princip·ally upon the testimony of plaintiff, Eliseo J. Mares, Jr. The plaintiff
te-stified· that· upon leaving Evanston he was riding in
the. front seat of the Ford automobile beside Stallings,
who· was driving the car; that he had had too much to
drink and·fell asleep. The next tlling he remembered on
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the trip "~as 'vhen Stallings \Yoke him up at a roadhouse
or tavern in Echo Canyon just before they got to the
lTtah State line. They stopped their car a little west
of the tavern as there were five or six cars parked in
front of the tavern. ·They went in to buy some beer to
take out. The bartender refused to sell th~m any beer
and told the1n that they ·had had too much to drink
already. Stallings then went outside and the plaintiff
stayed on the inside for some time arguing with the
bartender. Plaintiff then left the tavern and when he
got outside discovered Stallings was havin_g a .fight ~th
some fellows on the outside. Stallings was on the
ground and a ''big guy dressed like a cowboy with levi's
and boots'' was kicking him. The plaintiff tried to stop
the fight and one of the fellows threw him out of the.
fracas. The plaintiff went to the car, picked up a tire.
iron, came back to the scene of the fight and struck thei
fellow over the head with the tire iron, the one who was
kicking Stallings. The fellow fell down and plaintiff
thought he had killed him. Plaintiff was about .to hit
another of Stallings' attackers when he was hit over
the head and knocked unconscious. The next thing he
remembered he was ·going down Echo Canyon riding in
the front seat beside Jack. He testified that Stallings
was bleeding on the left side of his face and his left eye
was either out or partly· out of the socket. Stallings
had a wild look in his eye and was driving the car very
rapidly down the canyon; that Stallings' ap·pearance and
actions indicated that he was out of his head due to the
beating he had just received. Plaintiff tried to get hilu
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to stop the car hut he got no response and Stallings
kept driving the car faster and faster down the canyon.
The plaintiff started hollering for help as the car careened down the canyon road. Plaintiff then kicked
Stallings' foot off the accelerator in an effort to slow
down the speed of the car. In keeping Stallings' foot
off the accelerator he finally slowed the car down and
when it came to a turn he grabbed the steering wheel
and turned it off the road where it came to a stop
against a bank about a mile and a quarter west of the
town of Echo. He testified that Stallings had a wild
look .on his face; Mares jumped into the back seat.
~Stallings the:n slid out from under the wheel and started
toward plaintiff with a tire iron in his hand muttering
that he would kill him. Stallings tried to get into the
back seat to hit him with the tire iron and plaintiff
pushed his hands off the ·seat twice and .when he could
no longer resist him, plaintiff took the gun off the seat
and fired once through the right rear window. Plaintiff
said he did not think he hit Stallings with the bullet.
Stallings crump~led on the ground in an unconscious
condition. Plaintiff picked him up and put a Navy
blouse or a jacket around his neck and set him in the
front seat. He intended to take him to a hospital in
Salt L·ake City, so he turned the car around ·and drove
back to the junction, or underpass, to go down the Coalville road as he had noticed the sign Salt Lake City
when they passed the . junction. When they got to the
little town of Hoytsville, the car stopped. near a canal
bridge. He felt Stallings' heart and came to the conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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elusion that Stallings \vas dead. He then put the body
in the canal ditch \Yhere there was no water. He took
Stallings' \Vallet fron1 his person, which containe-d his
discharge papers and title to the car. He then drove
the car down Parley's Canyon and disposed of the car
and other property of Stallings as hereinabove set forth.
(R. 503-541)

±. The alleged killing occurred on June 24, 19'46;
Stallings' body was found on July 9, 1946, in the -canal
about three-quarters of a mile north of where the- canal
crosses the high,vay. It was caught in a flume. The
body was removed by Deputy Sheriff James H. Wilde,
the undertaker W. Harvey Dunn and others, and taken
to the Dunn Mortuary. A cursory examination of the
body disclosed that the left eye was out of the socket
lying on the left check. There was a puncture wound
above the right eye. An autopsy was performed by pr.
E. W. ·oldham and Dr. E. G. Wright in the pre~ence .of
W. Harvey Dunn, the undertaker, a dentist by the name
of F. J. Reese and Deputy :Sheriff James H. Wilde.
X-·ray ·pictures were taken of the head, spinal column
and the upper portion of the body and a complete autopsy was performe-d. The body was then buried and some
weeks later was disintered and additional autopsy 'W~s
performed. The X-ray pictures did not disc~ose the
presence of any bullet slug in the cranial cavity, nor
in the spinal column or any part of Stallings' body.
The autopsy disclosed a puncture wound directly over
the .right eye (Dr. Oldham testified in the right temple
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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region) but no exit wound was discovered in any part of
· the cranial skull spinal column or any other 'P;art of the
body of Stallings. No bullet slug was found in the
cranial cavity or the spinal column or any p~art of Stallings' body. The undertaker, W. Harvey Dunn, testified
that there were no powder burns around the puncture
wound. (R. 320, 321; 140-235)
I

'

·5, On the 19th day of August, 1946, plaintiff was
taken by Sheriff George M. Fisher and others over the
route he took from the place where he threw the gun
in I:mmigration Canyon, back through Parley's Canyon
to Ho~tsville, where the body was placed in the canal
and over the scene of the alleged crime. There were two
County Attorneys in this party, namely P. H. Neeley
of Summit County and a Mr. Connel of Morgan County, a Mr. Bernard Dahlquist, the Sheriff of Morgan County, Mr. Bagnell, a Deputy Sheriff of ~summit County
and Mr. London of the State Liquor Commission. Mr.
Bagnell, Mr. Mares and Sheriff Dahlquist were sitting
in the back seat of one car and P. H. Neeley and Sheriff
George Fisher were sitting in the front seat of said
car. Mr. London rode in a second ~r. The conversations which P. H. Neeley testified he had with the
plaintiff covering every element of this alleged crime
were elicited from the plaintiff during this ride. There
never was any court order in existence authorizing the
taking of the ·plaintiff back over the route he had followed during the 24th of J nne, 1946, for the purpose of
re-enacting the crime. (AF 3) All -of the ~above named
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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u~t·nesses testified at the preliminary hearing except

the Cou·nty Attorney P. H. Neeley. He oonducted· the
prelintinary hearing. These witnesses, at the preliminary hearing did not testify to ·any such conversation
betu,een P. H. Neeley and the plaintiff at the place of
the aUeged kiUing as testified t.o by P. H. Neeley at the
trial of this .case. They were all subpoenaed as the
State's witnesses at the trial of this case, but the State
did not call any of them. The plaintiff called Sheriff
Bernard Dahlquist in an effort to impeach Neeley's
testimony, relying upon the transcript of Dahlquist's
testimony taken at the preliminary hearing. The plaintiff testified that he did not disclose to the officers the
fight which occurred at the state line roadhouse or tavern
as he thought he had killed the person he hit over the
head with the tire iron and he did not want to be charged
with murder. He denied that he told P. H. Neeley or
anyone else that he planned to kill Stallings and s-teal
his car coming down from Wyoming. He testified that
he told P. H. Neeley that he planned to steal a car in
Wyoming, referring to the car which he intended to
steal at Evanston as. hereinabove set forth. He also
testified that he told Mr. Neeley it was a wonder Mr.
Stallings was not killed in Wyoming. (Plain·tiff had reference to the fight at the state line tavern, which he did
not disclose to Mr. Neeley). Mr. Mares contended that
Mr. Neeley garbled his statement when he testified that
plaintiff told him that he planned to kill Stallings 1n
Wyoming. ( R. 324-341 ; 543-57 4; AF 3)
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6. The plain tiff, Eliseo J. Mares, Jr., was arrested on the evening of August 16, 1946, at about 8 :30
P.M. and was taken to the Ogden City Ja;il where he
was booked by desk sergeant Howard K. Keeter. When
Mares asked, ''What is it all about~'' Keeter told Mares,
"We just wanted to do a little investigating, that was
all." (PT 108)
7. P. H. Neeley, County ·Attorney of Swnmit
County, who prepared the case for the prosecution from
its inception, interviewed the plaintiff on the 17th of
August at the Ogden City Jail. In that conversation
he told plaintiff that he had two lawyers for him, but
no lawyers ever ·contacted plaintiff until after he was
~ken before the com.mitting magi~trate. (R. 363)
On the evening of August 17th Neeley brought
people in to the Ogden jail to identify Mr. Mares as tlte
man who sold the decedent's car to Mr. Wistisen. He
would have Mr. Mares walkout from a little side room in
the Police Department and see if these p·eo1Jle could
identify· him. One of these p·ersons ·by the name ·of Bob
Young id~ntified him rather hesitatingly at first and
Mr. ~a~e~ ·cursed him, and Mr. Young said, ''Now I
know you are the man that sold that car." _(R. 363-372)
Neeley then testified as· follows: (R. 3-72-37.3)
. ''It just seemed to put a depression on everybody in there. I said to the boy: 'I will have.: to
file a complaint against you, it seems to 1ne, for
·stealing this car.' We sat there. 1t was late. 1
got up and I said: ''Have you anything further
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H e sa1"d : 'N o; ' and 'vhen we were
.
ready to leave he said to me: 'Come here.'

t o say.J>'

THE COURT: That is the defendant~
A. That was the defendant. He said:
'Come here~' and he pointed to that ·door ~ver
there 'vhere we had had him walk out of. I
went over ther·e and he said:. ''I stole that car.'
I said: 'Wait a minute, n1y boy. Let me get
your parents. Let me get your father and your
mother and .a lawyer, a friend. Haven't you
somebody~' I said: 'Don't tell that to me, hecause I will use it against you;' and he said:
'No,' he ·did not want anybody to know anything
about it. He did not want a lawyer. He did not
want his father or mother; and after that he at
times said he did not want them to know a thing
about it.
As I remember, on the 22nd of August,
against his will, I wrote to his father and ;told
him the predicament his son was in."
Up to this time the plaintiff had denied any connection with the alleged crime.
8. After this interview on the 17th of August,
two special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, namely J. Eldon Dunn and David W. Murray, were
sent up to Ogden to interrogate the plaintiff. These
special agents were not legally trained investigators, but
were used by the F.B.I. during the period of the war
by reason of the shortage of specially trained lawyers
regularly employed by this Federal Bureau. They were
closeted with the plaintiff, Mr. Mares, from two o'clock
until 7:00 o'clock on the afternoon of August 18th. (R.
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414). The interrogation of the plaintiff occupied approximately five hours' time. During said period Mr. Dunn
took notes of what Mares told him. Notes were introduced in evidence as p;art of the cross-examination of
Mr. Dunn as Exhibit 1.
Mr. Dunn testified as follows: (R. 41·3)

"Q. Mr. Dunn, during the hours that you
talked with him or the time that you talked with
him, before dictating this Exhibit 'P', you made
notes of the pertinent things which he stated to
you and you jotted them down in these notes
which now have been indentified as Exhibit 1 ~
A.

Yes, sir.

So anything that was pertinent to the
ease-l think I am using your language, am I not,
that is the language you used at the preliminary
hearing isn't it~
Q.

A. I used it in some question, yes, sir.

Q. You took those pertinent things down
and wrote the notes (R. 414) yourself after you
concluded the interview with this defendant, and
from those notes which you took down of what
he told you, you and Mr. Murray dictated Exhibit 'P' to the stenographer, Afton Kurns, did
you not¥
A.

We dictated part of it, yes, sir.

Q. Was there any part that anybody else
dictated7
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What part of Exhibit 'P' did anybody
else dictate, except you and Mr. Murray~
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and

...:\.

Specifically, I can't point to any part.

Q.

You can't 'point to any p·art ~

A.

No, sir.

Q.

Who else did the dictating besides you

~lr. nlurray~

A.

Part of it was dictated by 1\{r. Mares.

Q. But you can't point out one solitary bit
of infor1nation on any of this Exhibit 'P' that Mr.
~lares dictated, can you~

A.

Not specifically, no, sir.

Q. For instance, this first ·line here, the
first paragraph here of Exhibit 'P' :

'I Eliseo J. Mares, Jr., make the following
statement to David W. Murray and .J. Eldon
Dunn, who have identified themselves to me as
special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I make this statement voluntarily, of my
own free will, in the presence of Sheriff George
M. Fisher of Summit County, Utah, Sheriff Bernard Dahlquist, Morgan County, Utah, Captain
Clifford K. Keeter, Ogden City Police Department and P. H. Neeley, County Attorney of
Summit County, Utah. No threats or promises
have been used to induce me to make this statement, and I know that it ~n be used in a court
of law against me.'
(R. 415) The defendant did not dictate that, did
he~

A. No, sir.
Q.

You dictated it?

A.

Yes, sir.
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Q. He did not even know the names of these
people?
A. I don't recall whether he had been introduced to them or not.

Q.

But you dictated

A.

Yes, sir.

that~

Q. The only things which you examined
the defendant about, or the· story that he told
you, you jotted down all the important things
and put them in these notes, defendant's Exhibit 1, didn't you 1

A. I think so, yes, sir ... ( R. 422).
Q. Then you prepared Exhibit 'P' by dictating, either you or someone else, by calling in
the stenographer of the Chief of Police and she
took down the dictation 1

A. Yes, sir.
Q.

Is that correct 1

A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the dictation was dictated exactly
as it is put in this document, was it

not~

A. I believe so, yes, sir.
Q.. After it was dictated, she left and went
down and transcribed it did she not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you went out with the officers, to
dinner, someplace, did you not~
A. I believe I stayed in the building.
Q. You believe you stayed in the building~
A. Yes.
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Q. ,\. . ho gaYe you the docun1ent after she
transrribed itT
. .\..
Q.
this upT

She handed it to us.

' 'rere

you there when she typewrote

. A.. I think I was there for about five minutes, no longer.
Q. It took here so1netime to typewrite it, '
did it not~
.A..

Yes, sir. (R. 423).

Q. TheTe was never any dictation, or no
questions "\Yere ever propounded to Mr. 1Iares
and those questions taken down in shorthand by
~Iiss Kurns and then the answers made by Mr.
Mares and those answers taken down by the
stenographer, was there~
A.
form?

Do you mean in question and answer

Q. Yes.
A.

No, sir.... (R. 426).

You did not advise this boy that he
could have a lawyer, did you?
Q.

A.

No, sir.-

Q.

At any time?

A.

No, sir . .. (R. 427).

Q. (By Mr. McC·u.llovugh) I believe you
stated yesterday, Mr. Duwn, tha,t ·at no time did
you .advise Mr. Mares that he could ha:ve a lawyfr or should ha.ve a lawyer.
A.

That is right, yes, sir.
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You never heard an;yone in your presence
at amy time, during this interview from two
o'clock wntil seven o'clock, when you returned .
back to have this Exhib1it, the alleged confession,
$igned, you never he.ard any of those p eople present advise him he could have a lawyer?
Q.

1

A.

That is right.

Q. And the short statement of how the actual killing took place, which is contained on page
two of Exhibit 'P' which is known as Exhibit
'E' in the preliminary hearing, is the entire information which you re-ceived from Mr. Mares;
is that correct~
A.

No sir, that is not the entire statement.

Q. I did not ask you that. I asked you if
that is the entire instrument. To refresh your
memory, on page two of Exhibit 'E' now known
as Exhibit 'P' but known in the preliminary
hearing as Exhibit 'E':
'After Jack stop-ped the car by the side of
the road, (R. 428) we decided to rest there
awhile, and I got in the back seat. I had already
taken the pistol out of my suitcase and placed it
on the rear seat. I did this near Evanston, Wyoming, when I changed shirts after we had
stopp~d for a brief rest. After Jack stO'pped the
car, I got out of the front seat into the back seat
and was sitting there when Jack got out of the
car on the right side of the front seat and stood
by the car. He was bending over slightly by the
side of the car with his head a little below the
level of the car windows. I picked up the gun
which was on the rear seat beside me and extended it through the rear side window on the
right side of the car, close to Jack's head and
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~hot

once. Follo\\Ting the ~hot, he in1mediately
fell to the ground "Tithout uttering a sound. I
"Tas very frightened and wanted to run away,
but decided not to do that.'
T·hat is the entire inforn1ation which you re- .
ceived fron1 the defendant as to what took place
at the scene of the actual shooting; is that true~

A. I don't recall any
gave us on that point.
Q.
theyT
.A...

In ore

information he

Your notes are not even that full, are
X o sir, they are not.

Q. The fact of the matter is your notes do
not contain many of the statements that are in
that paragraph~

A.

That is right, yes, sir.

Q. So that the statement in this p~ragraph
is more elaborated than what you have in your
notes T (R. 429).
A.

Yes, sir.

Q. The only thing you have in your notes is
as follows-about the only thing I can see here
IS:

'Let back window down, got out of front opposite driver's side. Got gun put when you went
· in back seat. There fifteen minutes before he shot
him. Turned dome lights '-is that turned down
dome lights~ What is the rest
·J?

A.

Turned on do1ne lights.

Q.

'Poked pistol out.'

A. Yes, sir.
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A. Yes, sir.
Q.

Q.

That is all that is in the notes isn't

A.

I believe so, yes, sir.

it~

Q. May I get the answer, whether or not
that is all the information that is now contained
in Exhibit 'P' which I read to you and the notes
which I have just read to you in this Exhibit '1 ',
is all the information that you received from the
the defendant with reference to how the actual
killing took place ~

A.

I believe so, yes, sir.

Q. There isn't any question about it, is
there! That is what you so testified at the preliminary hearing isn't it~
. "
A . Y es, sir.

MR. DAVID W. MURRAY, :Special Agent for the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, testified at the preliminary hearing as follows: (PT 264).
'' Q. You say that this interview didn't last
until about 7:00 o'-clock in the evening~

A. I couldn't say exactly, sir.
Q. Then, after the interview took place you
called in a stenographer, didn't you~ ( PT 265)
A.
for us.

Captain Keeter secured a stenographer

Q. You dictated a statement, you and ~{r.
Dunn dictated a statement to this stenographer,
of what was purported to have been told you by
Mr. Mares?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23
That is right, sir.
Q. ''Tho dictated that Btateinent ~
~\. It "yas done jointly, with the assistance
of the defendant.
Q. ,,. . hy didn't you ask l\lr. Mares questions, and then have those questions taken down
in shorthand, then the answers which Mr. Mares
gave to the questions; why didn't you follow
that procedure~
A. Well, our custom ordinarily is to inter·vie'v the person that we are interested in, making
notes on the conversation or interview that takes
place, and then if a signed statement is necessary,
reduce the contents of that interview to writing.
Q. You think that is the way that the F.B.I.
officials usually do the job ~
£\.

it~

A.

That is the way I do

Q.

That is the way you do

A.

Yes, sir.

it~

Q. ·That is the way you did it in this
A.

case~

That is right, sir.

Q. The statements that you took from Mr.
Mares are contained in this Exhibit 'E' which
is p·urporting to be a statement given on August
18, 1946, and is signed by the defendant, and
also you as a witness. ( PT 266). That is your
name, David W. Murray~

A.

That is correct, sir.

Q. Does that statement contain the statements of the interview that "\Vas given between
the hours of 2 :30 and 7 :00 o'clock, whatever

time it wasY
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A. That is the story that Mr. Mares told
to us.
Q. And you took this statement fron1 the
notes that you took of his conversation~
A. And with his assistance at the time.

Q. Where is there any assistance; where is
there anything he dictated~ Can you point out
anything he dictated in this statement~
A. Not spe·cifically that he dictated, no, sir.
Q. The language in that statement was
either yours or Mr. Dunn's, wasn't it~
A. No, not necessarily so.
Q. Where is there any language Mr. Mares
used!
A. For instance, he says : 'I was born November 26, 1927, at Crowley, Colorado.'
Q. Did he say that~
A. Yes, he told us that.
Q. Did he say the following then-did he
say 'The following statement to David W. Murray and J. Eldon Dunn, who have identified
themselves to me as Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.' Did he make that
statem·ent?
A. No, he didn't make that statement.
Q. As far as the statement, the language
generally throughout the entire statement, is
either the language of you or Mr. Dunn, isn't itf
A.

I wouldn't say so.

Q. What would you say? Do you think
this young boy eighteen years of age, dictated
this language to the girl~
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

_...\.

Xot 1n the preli1ninary paragraph, no,

s1r.

Q. Did he dictate it in any part of the
paragraph·?
A. That is the story as he told it, reduced
to writing.

Q. vVho 'vas the one that dictated it to the
stenographer.

A. )!r. Dunn and myself, with the assistance of Mr. Mares.
Q. Did Mr. Mares make any dictation to
the girl1

A, He made statements
to the girl.

th~t

-we repeated

Q. In other words, all the dictation that the
girl took came f:rom you and Mr. Dunn; isn't
that correct¥

A. I would say that she took down what we
dictated.
Q. And what statements she took down,·
she took down from you and Mr. Dunn ; isn't that
correct'
A. Yes, I would say we dictated the statement.
Q. You didn't ever ask the witness to write
down the statement in his own handwriting, did
you?
A.

No, I didn't ask him.

Q. You didn't think it was good p~rocedure
to have the court reporter take the questions: you
propounded to l\lr. Mares, and then take his
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answers that he gave hack, in his own la·nguage;
(PT 268) you didn't follow any such procedure
as that, did you~
A. Not as we are doing today ...
Q. I am not asking ·about those things. 1
am asking you if, in the presence of Mr. Du;nn,
you told him he could have -a lawyer?
A. Not sp,ecifically. . . . ( PT 269) .
Q. I ,am asking you if you told, him he could
have a lawyer?
A. I don't recall w·hether or not we said
that to him.

Q. Did Mtr. Dwnn ever tell him he co-uld
have a tawyer?
A. I don't recall specifically that we t.old
him that.
Q. After the young lady took this statemetnt down and then transcribed it in its pres-ent
form, when you came back in the room the boy
was crying, w~asn't he?
A. He cried several times in m.y presence
and in that of Mr. Dwnn.

Q. You went and got him some aspirin,
didn't you!
A. I don't recall that I did, spe-cifically ..
. . (PT 270)

Q. Did you tell him he could have his father
here before he signed it~ (PT 271).

A. I didn't tell him that.
Q. Did anybody~
A. I don't recall anyone did.
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Q. Did you tell him he could. have a lG!Wyer here to ad vise hirn whether to sign it or not.
A. I did not.
Q. Did anybody?
A. I don't reoall whether anybody did.''
MRS. AFTON KURNS, at the preliminary hearing,
testified that she took the statement of the alleged confession, Exhibit 'P', down in shorthand. The actual
language was dictated by one of the two agents, namely
J. Eldon Dunn and David W. Murray. ('PT 277).
C. K. KEETER, Chief of Dectectives of the Ogden
Police Department, testified at: the preliminary hearing
as follows, regarding the condition of the plaintiff here~
in during the time of the interview while he was there :

(PT 314)
'' Q. Do you recall somehody getting him
some asperin ~
A. Yes.
Q. A:r:e yon sure he wasn't crying, and
somebody went and got him three asperin, and
gave it to him~
-·
· A. .I wouldn't be positive.
lect. ( PT 315).

I don't recol-

Q.

You remernber him getting asperin.

A.

Yes.

Q.

He said he had a splitting headache~

A.

I think I sent the jailer after the asperin.

Q.

He told .you he had a splitting headaehe '?

A.

Yes .... (PT 317) ..
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Q.

Did anybody say he could have a law-

A.

No, I don't think they did.

yer'
Q. Di'd 'anybody say he could have his
father? He was a minor only eighteen years of
age! (PT 318).
A.

He didn't ask for them.

Q.

You have got an eighteen year old

kid~

A. Not in my presence, and I don't think an
attorney or his father, either one, were mentioned.''
During the interview, and at the time the alleged
confession was signed, plaintiff herein complained of a
bad headache and an asperin was given to him after he
signed the alleged confession. (R. 380).
9. The alleged written confession identified as
State's Exhibit ''E'' at the preliminary hearing and
State's Exhibit "P" at the trial, was signed by the
plaintiff at approximately 10:30 P.M. on the night of
August 18th. CPT 213.). This alleged written confession of the !p,laintiff and the alleged conversation testi.:.
fie<;l to by P. H. Neeley covering conversations with the
plaintiff at the Ogden jail in Weber County on August
18, 1946, and alleged conversations with the plaintiff on
August 19, 1946, as testified to by P. H. Neeley during
the trip to the scene of the alleged crime, together with
the procedure, demonstrations and conduct of the plaintiff on said trip, were a substantial factor in the conviction of plaintiff of the charge of first degree murder.
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That on said trip \Vhen the plaintiff was requested
to state "'"hat had happened at Hoytsville where the body
was placed in the canal, P. H. Neeley testified as follows: (R. 328)
· · Q.

.AJl right, then what

happened~

. ..\... 1\lr. Fisher stopped the car and that was
on the south side of the culvert that crosses the
Hoytsville irrigation canal there where the road
passes over: and I remember the Sheriff of Morgan County (R. 329) asked Mr. Mares if he would
get out and Mr. ~1:ares hesitated at that point
and the Sheriff asked him kindly to get out and
told him: ''SOMETIME YOU WILL HAVE TO
niEET THIS ANYHOW'; and that Mr. Mares
got out with the Sheriff of Morgan County.
Q.

What then was said or done~

A. He was taken to the north side of the
bridge, the west side of the highway, where Mr.
Mares -said: 'Here is where the car stopped.
Here is where I took the body out and I placed
it under this bridge. After I had placed it under this bridge I took a pump and cleaned the
gasoline line out and then drove as fast as I
could along the road you have brought me over,
toward Salt Lake City.'
Q. Then what was done or said there,
please?

A. :Jfr. Mares said that he took the body
and placed it under the bridge on dry ground."
10. Plaintiff Eliseo J. Mares,. Jr., denied that he
ever read the alleged written confession known as Exhibit "P" before he signed it. He denied, further, that
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he knew what it contained. The following excerpt~ are
taken from his testimony: (R. 542, 545, 573, 574)
'' Q. , I will ask you, at that time, while you
were in the automobile, sitting in the back seat,
as you have indicated, who else was there in the
back seat'

A. That sheriff of Morgan County, Mr.
Bernard Dahlquist, and Earl Bagnell.

Q. Who was in the front
A.

seat~

P. H. Neeley and Sheriff Fisher.

I will ask you if, at any time, while you
were sitting in that back seat, in the presence of
these other gentlemen, if Mr. Neeley had this
conversation with you:
Q.

'I asked Mr. Mares when he conceived doing
this. He said when Mr. Stallings drove the car
over the Utah-Wyoming boundary line that Mr.
Stallings woke Mr. Mares up. Mr. Mares at that
time (R. 543) he said, Mr. Mares said at that time
he was sleeping in the back seat of the car, and
he said Stallings said : 'We are entering Utah. '
Mares then opened his suitcase, changed his
shirt, took the gun and laid it on the side of the
back seat, and said that he made up his mind to
kill Stallings, and take that car coming down
Echo Canyon.'
Did he ever have such a conversation with you
at that time'
A.

He did not.

Q. Did he have any such conversation with
you at any time 1

A.

No, sir.
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Did you ever stat~ the substance of this
c.onversation to ~[r. Neeley, or anyone else~
...-\.. I did, but not those words.

Q.

Q. ''-rhen did you Inake a statement to Mr.
X eeley, or in his presence, of anything that occurred in Wyoming~

A.
Q.
. A..

I made a state1nent in Ogden.
What day was that~
About two days after I was arrested.

Q.

That would be on the 18th of August.

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Where was

A.

Sir~

Q.

Where were you at that time.

it~

A. They brought me down to talk to the
Sheriff, Fisher.

Q.

Where was that, that place~

A.

In the jail down there. (R. 544).

Q.

In

Ogden~

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Who else was present, if you remember1
A.

S.heriff Fisher, Mr. Neeley and myself.

Q.

What did you say, if anything, to

them~

A. They asked me if I had been thinking
of killing him. All I said to them was : 'It is a
wonder he did not get killed in Wyoming.'
Q.

Did you say anything else about a

A.

Yes, sir.

car~
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Q. What did you say~
A. I said I planned to steal a car in Wyoming.
Q. Did you ever at any time tell Mr. Fisher
or Mr. Neeley that you planned to steal that car~
A. No, sir:' a car.'
Q. What were you referring to, in this
conversation, about taking a car in Wyoming~
A. I was referring to the one that a man
got out of, in that joint that Jack went into, to
wash his hands. He was drunk.
Q. Where was that joint you are talking
about~

A. In Evanston.
Q. Did you ever tell anyone that you
planned to kill Jack Stallings for the purpose of
stealing and taking his car~
A.

No, sir.

Q.

At any time or any rp~lace 1

A.

No, sir.

Q. You had an interview with Mr. Dunn
and Mr. Murray, did you not, in the County Jail
in O·gden~ (R. 545),

A.

Yes, sir.

Did you ever tell either one of those gentlemen-

A.

(Interposing)

No, sir.

Q. (Continued) Any information to that
effect¥
A. The information I gave then1 'vas-all I
said to them was what I told Mr. Neeley, that it
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\Va~

a "·onder that Jack did not get killed in Wyoining. They asked 1ne to repeat that, and I did
not repeat it.
Q. You did not rep·eat it~
~\. I did not.
Q. Did you ever disclose to them what happened in thi~ tavern up here by the State line~
...\. I did not.
Q. \Y.hy didn't you~
...\. Because I did not know whether I had
killed that 1nan or not.
Q. Did you disclose to anybody that information-that is, up till the time that you were
arrested, I mean up until the 19th day of August~
A. No, sir.
Q. And the reason for that was what~
A. Because I was afraid that if ,.I had
killed a man in Wyoming I would be blamed for
both of them.
Q. Did you ever have any animosity toward.
Jack Stallings~
A. No, sir.
Q. Did he toward you~
A. No, sir."
(R. 573)

Q. Why did you tell Mr. Neeley that Jack
was stooping over to look at his shoes, or the
door, and that you took the gun and put it
through the window and shot him in the head~
A. I did not tell him that.· Mr. Neeley made
that up. When he asked 1ne if it was that way
l accepted that.
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Q. You did not tell him that~
A. I did not.
Q. Did you tell Mr. Dunn that, and Mr.
Murray~

A. They done that themselves and I did not
put no objection to it.
Q. Did you tell them that~
A. I did not.
Q. You signed this Exhibit-you have seen
it, haven't you~
A. Yes.
Q. You knew it said that in there, didn't
you?
A. I don't know what it said in there.
Q. Never read it~·
A. I glanced through it but I did not read ·
it.
Q. Didn't you know what it said?
(R. 574)

A. I knew it said I had killed Jack. I did
not care then.
Q. You were not interested in how this
statement said you had killed him~
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

No, sir.
You did not think that
No, I did not eare then.
Why didn't you care~
I don't know.
What is that~
I don't know.''

mattered~
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11. On the 21st of August, 1946, a criminal complaint "?as lodged against the plaintiff wherein he was
charged with murder; a warrant was issued thereon and
.Jlares was brought before the committing magistrate
Willian1 H. Chappell, Justice of the Peace at Coalville,
Utah. At this appearance plaintiff was not represented
by counsel nor was he apprised of his rights to have
counsel (see Justice's Court proceedings), but the comnutting magistrate continued the preliminary hearing to
the 28th day of August, 1946, when he was again brought
before the said magistrate and there advised that he
was entitled to counsel "in every stage of the proceedings.'' Plaintiff then stated that ''he did not want an
attorney,'' but the magistrate being of the opinion that
he should have counsel again continued the matter until
the 9th day of September, 1946, in order that an attorney
might be arranged for. On August 30, 1946, two lawyers
were appointed by the District Court to represent the
accused and these attorneys then arranged for another
postponement until October 7, 1946. On that date the
attorney who had been retained by the family of the
accused entered his appearance, whereupon the two lawyers appointed by the court withdrew and the preliminary hearing was commenced and concluded the following day. Upon the termination of this hearing the plaintiff herein was bound over for trial on the charge of
murder in the first degree. Plaintiff did not see or tal~
with any lawyer, friends, parents or relatives from the
time he was arrested on August 16th until the 30th day
of August, 1946, when the two attorneys appointed by
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the District Court talked to him in the Salt Lake County
Jail. (See Justice's Court proceeding.) (AF 4)
12. The plaintiff was found guilty of first degree
murder and sentenced to be shot, as shown by the judgment and sentence and commitment attached to plaintiff's petition for Habeas Corpus. That the reputation
of plaintiff, Eliseo J. Mares, Jr. for being a law abiding
citizen up until the time he was inducted in the- United
States Army on or about Novem·ber 26, 1945, at the age
of 18 years was excellen t. (R. 495).
13. There were 39 members of the panel of prospective jurors; 4 were excused for cause as active clients
of P. H. Neeley; 3 were excused for cause for reason
of fixed opinions. Of the remaining 32, 26 personally
know P. H. Neeley and 20 of the 26 were fqrlmer clients
of P. H. Neeley. Of the 12 jurors who were chosen to
try the case, 10 were the personal friends of P. H.
Neeley and 7 of the 10 were former clients of P. H.
Neeley. The foreman of the jury was the Bishop of the
Church where P. H. Neeley was a High Priest in the
·eccle-siastical stake, which included the ecclesiastical
ward presided over by said foreman as the Bishop
thereof. That plaintiff's. counsel knew prior to the time
that the jury was sworn that the individual who subsequently became foreman of the jury was a Bishop in
said Church and that said P. H. Neeley was the County
Attorney and an active church man, but neither plaintiff
nor his counsel knew at that time that the ~State was
going to use said County Attorney as its major witness
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at the trial, the said County Attorney's nan1e not having

been endorsed on the information as a witness in accordance with the Statute and practjce in said state. (AF. 6)

ST.A.TEMENT OF POINTS
1. THE ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF PETITIONER'S ALLEGED ·CONFESSION VIOLATED HIS RIGHTS
UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION- .OF .THE
UNITED STATES AND SECTION 7 ARTICLE I ',OF THE·
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.
2. THE FAILURE TO FURNISH TO PLAINTIFF, WHO.
WAS ACCUSED OF A CAPITAL OFFENSE, THE AID OF
COUNSEL DURING HIS INCARCERATION FROM THE
TIME HE WAS ARRESTED ON THE 16TH DAY OF AUGUST, 1946, UNTIL HE WAS TAKEN BEFORE THE COM.;.
MITTING MAGISTRATE ON THE 28TH OF AUGUST, 194_6,
WAS A VIOLATION OF THE DUE PRO;GESS CLAUSE._OF:
THE 14TH AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES AND SECTION 7 ARTICLE _I OF·
THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.
·. ,· ·:.\)
3. THE ADMISSION IN EVIDEN,CE OF STATEMENTS
ELICITED FROM PLAINTIFF DURING HIS TWELVE-DAY
PERIOD OF INCARCERATION, AT WHICH TIME HE WAS
WITHOUT COUNSEL, RELATIVES, GUARDIANS AND
FRIENDS, AND HAD NOT BEEN INFORM;ED .OF_· t.llS,_
RIGHT TO COUNSEL; AND FURTHERMORE TH;E ~Dl\1I~~~
SION IN EVIDEN.CE OF TESTIMONY CONCEifNlNG- A
PURPORTED RE-ENACTMENT OF THE CRIME 'STAGED~
WITHOUT A COURT ORDER THREE DAYS .AFTER~~TJ:f'E'i:
ACCUSED. HAD BEEN ARRESTED AND. WHILE HE· WAS~
STILL BEING HELD ILLEGALLY BY THE POLICE ANO
DETECTION OFFICIALS WITHOUT ASSISTANCE- OF
CO·UNSEL, RELATIVES, GUARDIANS AND FRIENDS VIOLATED HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE~
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OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 'THE UNITED STATES AND SECTION 7 ARTICLE I OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.
4. IT IS A VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE 14TH AMENDEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND SECTION 7
ARTICLE I OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH AND SECTION 105-13-17 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1943, TO ADl\1IT
IN EVIDENCE AT THE TRIAL OF THE ACCUSED CONFESSIONS AND STATEMENTS ELICITED FROM THE
A1GCUSED DURING ILLEGAL DETENTION DUE TO FAILURE PROMPTLY TO GARRY A PRISONER BEFORE ·A
COMMITTIN~G MAGISTRATE.

ARGUMENT
PROPOSITION I. THE ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF
PETITIONER'S ALLEGED CONFESSION VIOLATED HIS
RIGHTS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES AND SECTION 7 ARTICLE I
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.

At the time of plaintiff's arrest on August 16, 1946,
at Ogden, Utah, plaintiff was 18 years of age. He had
been inducted into the United States Army some nine
months p~rior to his arrest. ( AF 6; R. 495) There is
nothing in the record to show that plaintiff .was skilled
in the law. His reputation for being a law abiding
citizen up until the time he was inducted into the United
States Army on or about November 26, 1945, at the age
of 18 years, was excellent. (R. 495; AF 5) Hence, it
must be concluded that this young boy at the time of his
arrest was totally unfamiliar with criminal procedures,
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and certainly not a\\Tare of his constitutional rights
under the criminal law.
The plaintiff was arrested on the evening of August
16, 1946, at about 8:30 P.M. and was taken to the Ogden
City jail where he was booked by desk sergeant Howard
K. Keeter. -When plaintiff asked, ''What is it all about?''
Keeter told him, '·We just wanted to do. a little investigating, that was all.'' (PT 108; AF 2)'
P. H. Neeley, County 'Attorney ·of Summit County,
wno prepared th~ case for the prosecution from its inception:, interviewed plaintiff on the 17th of August at'
the Ogden City Jail. In that conversation he told plain~·
tiff that he had two lawyers for him, but no lawyers ever
contacted plaintiff until after he was taken before the
committing magistrate August 28, 1946. (R. 363; AF· 3-)
On the evening of August 17th Neeley brought
people into the Ogden jail to identify plaintiff as the
man who sold the decedent's .car to Mr. Wistisen. He
would have plaintiff walk out from a little side room
in the Police Department and see if these people could
identify him. (R. 363-372; AF 2)
After this interview on the 17th of August, tw,o
special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
namely J. Eldon Dunn and David W. Murray, were
sent to Ogden to interrogate the plainti~. These special
agents were not legally trained investigators,. but ~ere
used by the F.B.I. during the period of the war by reason
of the shortage of specially trained lawyers regula~ly
employed by this Federal Bureau. They were closeted
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with the plaintiff from two o'clock until seven o'clock
on- the afternoon of August 18th. The interrogation of
the plaintiff occupied aptproximately five hours' time.
During said period Mr. Dunn took notes of what plaintiff told him. These notes were introduced in evidence I
as part of the cross-examination of Mr. Dunn. (R. 414; :
AF 2) It was during this period of questioning that
the alleged confession of plaintiff was obtained. The
entire alleged confession of the plaintiff, after ap·proximately five hours of questioning, was dictated by these
two special agents of the F.B.I. to the stenographer
of the Chief of Police. (R. 413-429; PT. 264-269; AF 2) I
This typewritten statement, dictated by these two special agents, was allowed by the court to be introduced
in evidence at the trial of the plaintiff and was a substantial factor in his conviction. (AF 5) During the
examination of plaintiff by these sp·ecial agents, plaintiff was not advised of his rights to counsel. · (R. 426,
427; PT 268, 269; AF 3)
i

1

1

It should be noted that the alleged confession secured
from plaintiff is repugnant to and positively inconsistent
with the factual evidence as given by the State's own
witness. The State called Mrs. Gladys Richins Jones
as its witness. Mrs. Jones lives on the Echo· Canyon
road about two city blocks east of the iJOint of the alleged
killing of Stallings. She testified that in the latter part
of June, to-wit, around th_e 23rd or 24th of the month,
she was awakened in the early hours of the morning by
a ,car traveling west on the road in front of their home;
that she heard a man crying for help as the car proSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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, c.eeded do"~n to the point of the alleged slaying.. When~ the car stopped she heard a voice say, "don.'t, don,'t,
: don •t do it,·· then she heard a shot and after a period of
: quiet the car backed up and turned around and went.
• back up the road past her home; she got to the window
just after the shot was fired; she saw the car turn back
onto the road and travel back east past her home toward
the town of Eeho. (R. 436-451).
The confession dictated by the special agents ~f the
F.B.I. bespeaks a surreptitious killing and no place' does
it refe·r to calls for "help". The pertinent part is'_:-as
follows:
"After Jack stopped the car by the side of
the road, we decided to rest there awhile, and
I got in the back seat. I had already taken the:
pistol out of my suitcase and placed it on the
rear seat. I did this near Evanston, Wyqr.ning,,
when I changed shirts after we had stopp~d·for·
a brief rest. After Jack stop·ped the car, 'I·. gof
out of the front seat into the back seat and' was·
sitting there when Jack got out of the car_ o;n
the right side of the front seat and stood by the
car. He was bending over slightly by the side
of the car with his head a little below the level
of the car windows. I picked up the gun which
was on the rear seat beside me and extende~: it
through the rear side window on the· ~i,g}Jt :sige.
of the car, close to Jack's head and shot once.'
Following the shot he immediately fen· fo:· the)
ground without uttering a sound. I Wa:S .very:·,
frightened and wanted to run away, but decided
not to do that." (R. 399-408)
This point is presented by plaintiff, not to show
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with the plaintiff from two o'clock until seven o'clock
on the afternoon of August 18th. The interrogation of
the plaintiff oc.cupied ap~proximately five hours' time.
During said period Mr. Dunn took notes of what plaintiff told him. These notes were introduced in evidence
as part of the cross-examination of Mr. Dunn. (R. 414;
AF 2) It was during this period of questioning that
the alleged confession of plaintiff was obtained. The
entire alleged confession of the plaintiff, after ap~prox
imately five hours of questioning, was dictated by these
two special agents of the F.B.I. to the stenographer
of the Chief of Police. (R. 413~429; p·T. 264-269; AF 2)
This typewritten statement, dictated by these two special agents, was allowed by the court to be introduced
in evidence at the trial of the plaintiff and was a substantial factor in his conviction. (AF 5) During the
examination of plaintiff by these sp~ecial agents, plaintiff was not advised of his rights to counsel.· (R. 426,
427; PT 268, 269; AF 3)
It should be note-d that the alleged confession secured
from plaintiff is repugnant to and positively inconsistent
with the factual evidence as given by the State's own
witness. The State called Mrs. Gladys Richins Jones
as its witness. Mrs. Jones lives on the Echo· Canyon
road about two city blocks east of the 1JOint of the alleged
killing of Stallings. She testified that in the latter part
of June, to-wit, around the 23rd or 24th of the month,
she was awakened in the early hours of the morning by
a ·car traveling west on the road in front of their home;
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c.eeded down to the point of the allege,d slaying.. W}l~11
the car stopped she heard a voice say, '' dQn.'t, don't,
don't do it,'' then she heard a shot and after a period of
quiet the car backed up and turned around and went.
back up the road past her home; she got to the window
just after the shot was fired ; she saw the car turn back
onto the road· and travel back east past her home toward.
the town of Echo. (R. 436-451).
The confession dictated by the special agents of the
F.B.I. bespeaks a surreptitious killing and no .phice'·· noes
it refe·r to calls for "help,". The pertinent part ·is ··as
follows:
.
''After Jack stopped the ear by the side of
the road, we decided to rest there awhile, and
I got in the back seat. I had already taken the:
pistol 'out of my suitcase and placed it on the.
rear seat. I did this near Evanston, W yqr.niD:g, .
when I changed shirts after we had stoppE1d ·fo-r·
a brief rest. After Jack stop·ped the car, I~· gof
out of the front seat into the back seat and was·.
sitting there when Jack got out of the car. ~~
the right side of the front seat and stood by the
car. He was bending over slightly by the side
of the car with his head a little below the level
of the car windows. I picked up the gun which
was on the rear seat beside me and extended ,_it
through the rear side window on the. right :si.de
of the car, close to Jack's head and shot once.'
Following the shot he immediately fell fo:·the::
ground without uttering a sound. I was :Very:.··
frightened and wanted to run away, but decided
not to do that." (R. 399-408)
.. This point is presented by plaintiff, not to show
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onstrate how inconsistent this alleged confession is
when compared with the facts given by the State's own
witness. Furthermore,· this witness, Mrs. Gladys Richins
Jones, was the only direct witness to the alleged killing.
The only conclusion is that the alleged confession was
not freely and voluntarily given by plaintiff, but rather
a figment of imagination of the two special agents of
the F.B.I. w·ho dictated it.
It is plaintiff's contention that an alleged confession
se~ured under these circumstances is inadmissible on the
grounds that it was secured by force and coercion. It is
not evident from the record whether physical violence,
torture or threats. thereof were used, but psychological
pressure and mental fear are abundantly demonstrated.
An 18 year old boy arrested, interviewed by police officers, detectives, prosecutors and finally on the third day
after his arrest, after five hours of examination by two
F.B.I. agents, he agrees to sign an alleged confession
dictated by these two F.B.I. agents to the stenographer
of the Chief of Police. Mr. Murray, one of the special
agents, testified that during their examination: ''He
cried several times in my presence and in that of Mr.
Dunn.'' (PT 269) C. K. Keeter, Chief of Detectives of
the Ogden Police Department, testified that plaintiff
complained of a ''splitting headache,'' during the time
of the interview while Keeter was there. ( PT 314-318;
AF 2).
. .. . . ... . . ... _
The protection which the Constitutions of the United
States and the State of Utah provide was denied this
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young boy. Without the protection and advice of family,
friends, relatives or counsel, he was subjected to inces:sant questioning by police, detectives, prosecutors, spe:cial agents of the F.B.I. It is a foregone conclusion that
in the mind of this young boy the power of these officers
of the la'v was greatly magnified.
The uncontroverted facts bring this case .square~y
within the host of decisions, the ·p·rinciples of whi~4-:·a:~e.
summarized in ~fcNABB v. UNI·TED STATE.S, !·3i8.
U.S. 322, 340: ''. . . this Court has, on Constitutional
grounds, set aside convictions, both in the Federal and
State Courts, which were based upon confessions se·cu·red
by protracted and r·epeated questioning of ignoranf and
untutored persons, in whose minds the power of officers·
was greatly magnified: LISENBA v. CALIFbRNIA;
314 U.S. 219, 239, 240; 86 L. Ed. 166, 181, 182; J{i2 S. Ct.':
280, or 'who have been unlawfully held incommu:riieai<lo:
'vithout advice of friends or counsel': WARD v. TE:1.~AS,
316 U.S. 547, 555; 86 L. Ed. 166.3, 1667; 62 S. Ct.. 1;139.;
and see BROWN v. MIS'S,ISSIPPI, 297 U.S... 27~; 80. L.
Ed. 682; 56 S. Ct. 461; CHAMBERS v. FL:ORI~Ai.
309 U.S. 227; 84 ~- Ed. 716; 60 S ..Ct. 472; CANT.~ v.
ALABAMA, 309 U.S. 629; 84 L. Ed. 988; 60 S. _J:Jt.. ·.-p:~.? 7·
WHITE v. TEXAS, 310 U.S. 530; 84 L. Ed._ 1342.i ~0
S. Ct. 1932; LOMAX v. TE·XAS, 313 U.!S.. 54.4;. -~5 Ic4~
Ed. 1511; 61 S. Ct. 956; VERNO·N v. ALABAM'A;":·_~i3
U.S. 547; 85 L. Ed. 1513; 61 S. Ct. 1092. ''
In the case of WATTS v. STATE OF INDIANA,
338 U.S. 49; 69 S. Ct. 1347 (1949) the United States
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

44
Supreme Court reversed a .conviction for murder where
the evidence showed that the accused had been questioned incessantly, had not been taken p·romptly before a
magistrate and was not advised of his constitutional
rights, and that during this period of time a confession
was secured which was used in accused's conviction.
The Court held that there had been a denial of due
process of law in violation of the 14th Amendment to
the Constitution of the United 'States.
The Court stated at prage 52: ''There is torture of
mind as w·ell as body; the will is as mu)_ch affected by
fear as by force. And there comes a point where this
Court, should not be ignorant as judges of w~hat we know
as men. See Taft, C. J., in the Child Labor Tax Case
(BAILEY v. DREXEL FURNITURE CO.) 259 U.S.
20, 37, 42 s.-· Ct. 449, 450, 451; 66 L. Ed. 817, 21 A.L.R.
1432. ''
Page 53: "A confess~on by W'hich life bli{;omes fo·rfeit must be the expression of f.ree choice. A. st,atement
to be voluntary of course nee:d not be volrwnteered. But
if it is the pr,odtuct, .of sustained pressure by the police
it does not issue from a free choice. When a suspect
speaks becOJUSe he is oveiborne, it is immaterial w·he·ther
he has been subjected to ra physioal or mental o·rde~al.
Eventual _yielding to questio'Yiiitn,g 'IJJ'nder such circum. .
stances is p,Zainly the pro1d/uct of t,he suction pro c-ess o/
interrog-ation and therefore the r-everse of volunt-ary.''
1

Page 54: TO TURN THE DE·TENTION OF AN
ACCUSED INTO A PROC-ESS OF WRENCHING
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FRO~I

HIM E'-riDENCE WHICH CO·ULD NOT·. BE
EXTORTED IN OPEN COURT WITH ALL ·ITS
SAFEGUARDS, IS' so GRA\TE AN ABUIS,E OF THE
POWER OF ARREST AS TO OFFEND THE PRO-·
CEDURAL STANDARDS O·F DUE PROCES1S~.
'~This

is so because it violates the underlying prin~
ciple in our enforcement of the criminal law. .Ours is
the accusatorial 'as opposed to the inquisitorial' SYStelll.
Such has been · the characteristic of Anglo~American:
criminal justice since it freed itself from practices b'orrowed by the Star Chamber from the Continent whereby.
an accused was interrogated in secret for hours on end .
. . . Under our system society carries the burden of
proving its charge against the accused not out _of his
.
.r
own mouth. It must establish its case, not by inter-:rogation of the accused even under judicial safe~~r4~,:
but by evidence independently secured through. 8ki\J,f#l
investigation. 'The law will not suffer a prisoner t~· ·be~
made the deluded instrwnent of his own conviction.'
2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, c. 46 Par. 34 (8th__ ~d.
1824). The requirement of specific charges, their pr,qof
bey01Ul, a reasonable douJJt, the protection of the ~~~~,,
from confessions extorted through whatever form of
police presswres, the right to a pr·ompt he~arif!,g.1 .Pf3.JO!re
a magistrate, the right to assist·ance of coiun$el,. to- ·:be.
supplied by· g;overnment when circu.mstances ·make it
necessary, the duty to advise an accused of his 'Constituttonal rights-these are all characteristics of the accu.satorial system -arnd manifest~ations of its dem~a'l?tds..''
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· Page· 55: ''In holding the Due Pro-cess Clause bars
police procedure which violates the basic notions of our
accusatorial mode of ~P'rosecuting crime and vitiates a
conviction based on the fruits of such procedure, we
apply the Due Process Clause to its historic fun·ction
of assuring ·ap,propriate proced!ure before liberty is curtailed or life is taken.''

Justice Douglas in a con~urring op1n1on states ·at
page 57 : '' ... Detention without ~arraig,rnnnent is a timehonored method for keepitn.g lUYb accus·ed 1JIIUler the excllusiv~ :cotnt~ol of. the police. They earn t:hen. ope;rat·e at
their leisure. The accused is W'holly at their mercy. ·He
is W'ithovut the ~aid ·of counsel or friends; and he is denied
the ·pro~t.ection of the m,agistrate. We should un.equivooally condemn the proc.edtUre amd stand re~ady to outlaw,
as we did in Malimski v. Peorp le ·of ~Stale 10{ New York,
324 U. 8. 401, 65 B. Ct. 781, 89 L. Ed. 1029 and Haley v.
State of Ohio, 332 U. 8. 596, 68 8. Ct. 302, 92 L. E_d.
224, an~Ay c.o~fessi·on obtained during the period of t:he
wnJawful de:tention. The procetl!Ure bree·ds coerced con-·
fessiovns. It is the ro-ot of the evil. It Vis the proced/ure
without ··which the inquisition oould not flo'urish in the
count·ry. ''
1

For .two other recent United iStates Supreme Court
decisions decided in 1949, and bearing on this same point
see TURNER v. CO·MMO·NWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 358 U;S. 6·2, 69 Supreme Ct. 1'352 (1949); also
see HARRIS v. STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 338
U.S. 68, 69 S. Ct. 13'54 ( 1949) .
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

47

In MALINSKI ET AL. v. NEW YORK, 324 U.S.
401, 404, the court stated: ··If ·all the attendoot ci.rcum,stances indicate that the confession W·as coerced~ or
compelled, it nzay not be u.sed to convict a defendant.
ASHCRAFT v. TENN. 332 U.S. 143, 154. A(Ylid if it is
introduced at the trial the jt«lgment of conviction w'ill
be set aside even though the evidence apart from the confession might have been sufficient to sustain the jury's
verdict; LYO·NS v. OKLAHOMA, 322 U.S. 596, 597."
PROPOSITION II. THE FAILURE TO FURNISH TO PLAIN-TIFF, WHO WAS ACCUSED OF A CAPITAL OFFENSE,
THE AID OF ·COUNSEL DURING HIS INCARCERATION
FROM .THE TIME HE WAS ARRESTED ON THE 16TH
DAY- OF AUGUST, 1946, UNTIL HE WAS TAKEN BEFORE
THE COMMITTING MAGISTRATE ON THE 28TH OF AUGUST, 1946, WAS A VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND SECTION 7
ARTICLE I OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.

Plaintiff :was arrested and taken into custody by the
police on August 16, 1946, (R. 495; AF 6). The following day on August 17th plaintiff was interviewed by the
County Attorney, P. H. Neeley. That evening of the
same day plaintiff was again interviewed by Neeley
and also was exposed to the view of certain persons
brought to the jail by P. H. Neeley for purposes of
identification. During these interviews P. H. Neeley,
County Attorney for Summit County, told petitioner
he had two lawyers for him, but no lawyers ever contacted plaintiff until after he was taken before the committing magistrate. (R. 363-372; AF 2). On the 18th
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of August, 1946, plaintiff was again questioned. This
time two special investigators of the F.B.I. made the
examination and after five ·hours of questioning, an
alleged confession was dictated by these two special
agents to the Chief of Police's stenographer and app~rox
imately three hours later, or 10:00 P.M., plaintiff signed
it. (R. 414; AF· 2). During the examination of plaintiff
by these two special agents of the F.B.I. plaintiff was
without the aid of family, friends or relatives, and particularly without the aid of counsel. Plaintiff was never
advised of his rights to counsel, or that he .might have
his father, etc., present to advise him. (R. 423-427; PT
269-271 ; AF 3). The two special agents of the F.B.I.
who secured the alleged confession testified concerning;
this matter.

MR. J. ELDO·N DUNN testified as follows: (R.
427)

'' Q. Yon did not advise this boy he could have a
lawyer, did you?

A. No, sir.
Q. At any time?
A. No, sir....
Q. (By Mr. McCullough) : I believe you stated
yesterday, Mr. Dunn, that a.t no time did you advise
Mr. Mares he could have a lawyer or should have a
lawyer.

A.

That is right, yes, sir.
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Q. You never heard anyone in your presence a.t
any time during this interview from two o'clock until
seven o'clock, w·hen you returned back to have this exhibit, the alleged confession, signed, you never heard
any of these people present advise him he could have a
lawyert
A.
~IR.

That is right.''
DA\"1:D W. MURRAY testified as follows: (PT

268-271)

'' Q. I an1 not asking about those things. I am
asking you if, in the presence of Mr. Dunn, you told
him he could have a lawyer!
A.

Not specifically.

Q. I am asking you if you told him he could have
a lawyerY
A. I don't recall whether or not we said that to
him.

Q. Did Mr. Dunn ever tell him he could have a
lawyer!
A. I don't recall specifically that we told him that.

Q. After the young lady took this statement down
and then transcribed it in its present form, when you
came back in the room the boy was crying wasn't he~
A. He cried several times in my presence and in
that of .Mr. Dunn.

Q. · You went and got him some aspirin, didn't
you!
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A.

I don't recall I did specifically....

Did you tell him he could have his father here
before he signed it?
Q.

A. I didn't tell him that.
Q.

Did anybody?

A. I don't recall anyone did.
Q. . Did you tell him he could have a lawyer here

to advise him whether to sign it or not.
A. I did not.
Q.

Did anybodyt

A. I don't recall whether anybody did.''
C. K. KEETER, Chief of Detectives of the Ogden
Police Department, testified at the preliminary hearing
as follows: (PT 317, 318)
Q.

Did anyone say he could have a

A.

No I don't think they did.

lawyer~

Did ~nybody say he could have his
He was only a minor eighteen years of age~
Q.

father~

A.

He didn't ask for them.

Q.

You have got an eighteen year old

A.

Not in my presence, and I don't think any

kid~

attorney or his father, either one, were mentioned.''
On the 19th of August, 1946, 'Plaintiff was taken
by P. H. Neeley, County Attorney, and other officers
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back over the route of the alleged crime. This was done
\Yithout an order fron1 the court authorizing such -a
procedure. (AF 3). On the 21st of August, 1946, a
criminal con1plaint was lodged against plaintiff wherein
he 'vas charged \Yith 1nurder; a warrant was issued
thereon and plaintiff was brought before the committing
n1agistrate ''Tilliam H. Chappell, Justice of the Peace
at Coalville, Utah. At this appearance plaintiff was
not represented by counsel nor was he apprised of his
rights to have counsel, but the committing magistrate
continued the prelinrinary hearing to the 28th day of
August, 1946, when he was again brought before said
magistrate and there advised that he w·as entitled to
counsel '• in every st.age of the proce.edings. '' (See
Justice's Court proceedings). (AF 4). Plaintiff then
stated that he did not want an attorney, but the
magistrate being of the opinion that he shoul·d
have counsel again continued the matter. On August
30, 1946, two lawyers were appointed by the District
Court and for the first time since his incarceration, on
August 16, 1946, he was represented by co~nsel and
advised of his rights. The committing magistrate's
statement that plaintiff was entitled to c?unsel ''in
-every stage of the :proceedings'' was ironical at this
stage of the proceedings. The very essence o~ a fair
trial was already precluded if the testimony and alleged
confessions which were secured during this period were
allowed in evidence. This young boy needed counsel and
fatherly advice during the period of time he was _held
ineommunicado subjected to questioning .by the police,
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detectives, and special agents of the F.B.I. The fears
and anxiety of a boy this age held under similar circumstances such as was plaintiff, can readily be irnagined. Testimony and alleged confessions secured under
such circumstances, fraught with emotion, anxiety and
fear could certainly never be considered by this court
or the United States Supreme Court as "confess ions,
and testimony freely and' vo!Jwnt,arily given.'' The provision of the law requiring that plaintiff be taken promptly before a committing magistrate was enacted to preclude the very thing which took place here. This safeguard if it had been allowed to plaintiff would not have
permitted the violation of plaintiff's fundamental rights.
(See 105-13-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1943). But, even
this safeguard of fairness and justice was denied to
plaintiff, during which time the police, detectives, special agents, and county attorney could at their leisure
exact from this boy the alleged confessions and statements.
1

In the ·case of WOOD v. UNITED STATES, 128
F. 2d 265, at page 271, the court stated: The ,aid of
counsel in prep,arration would be farc~cal if the oase
could be fo·reclosed by prelimilnary inquisition w·hich
would squeeze out conviction or prejudice by means
unconstitutional if used at trial. ... ''
Plaintiff was entitled to be rep·resented by counsel
at the trial, at the preliminary hearing, and ''at eve.ry
stage .of the proceedings,'' but from the time of his incarceration until the preliminary hearing, a period of
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t\velve days, plaintiff "\\ras denied this fundamental right.
If fairness and justice de1nand that an accused be represented by counsel in the conduct of his trial, then
certainly fairness and justice demand that this young
boy be represented by counsel during the twelve days he
"~as held by the police and subjected to questioning and
intervie\\Ts, all in derogation of his constitutional and
legal rights of a prompt hearing before a com.mitting
Inagistrate and the right to advice from family, friends,
relatives and counsel.

In GIBBS v. BURKE, 337 U.S. 773, 69 S. Ct. 1247
(1949) the United States Supreme Court reversed a
conviction of a defendant who was not offered counsel
or adequate judicial guidance or !protection and of necessity conducted his O"\vn defense. Even though ·the decision of the court in this case is based on the lack of
counsel at the trial it has a definite bearing on the present controversy and the question of violation of an
accused's rights under Due Process. The court stated
at pages 780 and 781 : '' ... Our decisions have been tha.t
where the ignorance, youth, or o·ther incapacity of the
defendant made .a trial without covunsel unfair, the defendant ·is deprived of his liberty contrary to the F:oUJrteenth Amendment. Counsel necessary for his adequate
defense would be lacking ....
''Furthermore, the
largely on the wisdont
Judge. He knows the
prinLary duty falls -on

fair conduct ·0f ·a trial depends
and wnderstarnding of the trial
essentials of a fair trial. The
him to determine the accused's
1
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need of counsel at artraignment and d1:f;ring trial. He
may gwide ·a defendant u.tithout a tawyer past the errors
that make trWls Uhl),fair. . .. Failure to protect properly
the rights of one accuse·d of a serious ·offense is UIYIIUSual.
Ob·viously ·a fair trial test necessit~ates an appraisal
b·efore ·(J;'nd druring the trial of the facts of each cas·e to
determitne WHETHER THE NEED FOR COUNSEL

WORKS A FUNDAMENTAL UNFAIRNE!S1S.''
See also, WATTS v. STATE O·F INDIANA, 338
U.S. 49; 69 S. Ct. 1347 (1949; TURNER v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 258 U.S. 62, 69 S.
Ct. 1352 (1949); HARRIS v. S·TATE O·F :S.OUTH
CAROLINA, 338 U.S. 68; 6'9 S. Ct. 1354 (1949). (All
cited supra).
PROPOSITION III. THE ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF
STATEMENTS ELICITED FROM PLAINTIFF DURING HIS
TWELVE-DAY PERIOD OF INCA~CERATION, AT WHICH
TIME HE WAS WITHOUT COUNSEL, RELATIVES, GUARDIANS AND FRIENDS, AND HAD NOT BEEN INFORMED
OF HIS RI,GHT TO COUNSEL; AND FURTHERMORE THE
ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF TESTIMONY CONCERNING A PURPOR.TED RE-ENACTMENT OF THE CRIME
STAGE·D WITHOUT A COURT ORDER THREE DAYS
AFTER THE ACCUSED HAD BEEN ARRESTED AND
WHILE HE WAS STILL BEIN'G HELD ILLEGALLY BY
THE POLICE AND DETECTION OFFICIALS WITHOUT
ASSISTANCE OF COUNS.EL, RELATIVES, GUARDIANS
AND FRIENDS VIOLATED HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
AND SECTION 7 ARTICLE I OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
u·TAH.
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On the 19th day of August,·1946, plaintiff was taken
by Sheriff George l\I. Fisher and others over the route
he took fron1 the place 'vhere he threw the gun in
linn1igration Canyon, back through Parley's Canyon to
Hoytsville, \Yhere the body was placed in .the canal and
over the scene of the alleged crime. There were two
County Attorneys in this party, namely P. H. Neeley of
Sununit County and a Mr. Conilel of Morgan County, a
:Jir. Bernard Dahlquist, the Sheriff of Morgan County,
~fr. Bagnell, a ·deputy sheriff of Summit County and
l\Ir. London of the State Liquor Conrmission. Mr.
Bagnell, ~Ir. Mares and Sheriff Dahlquist were sitting
in the back seat of one car and P. H. Neeley and Sheriff
George Fisher were sitting in the front seat of said car.
~Ir. London rode in a second car. The conversations
which P. H. Neeley testified he had with the 'P'laintiff
covering every element of this alleged -crime were elicited from the plaintiff during this ride. There never was
any court order in existence authorizing the taking of
the plaintiff back over the route he had followed during
the 24th of June, 1946, for the purpose of re-enacting
the alleged crime. (R. 324-370; AF 3). This testimony,
along with the alleged conversations also testified to
by P. H. Neeley covering conversations with the plaintiff
at the Ogden jail in Weber County on August 18, 1946,
was allowed in evidence at the trial of the plaintiff over
the objections of counsel, and was a substantial factor in
the conviction of plain tiff of the charge of first degree
111urder. (AF 5).
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Even after securing an alleged confession from this
boy, the police and prose-cuting officials still were not
satisfied. Holding this boy incommunicado and. under
their control was their means to secure the answers and
testimony that they wanted. The argument which plaintiff has set forth in Proposition I of his Argument,
regarding the admissibility of the alleged written confession is equally pertinent here. P. H. Neeley's testimony covering· the conversations with the plaintiff, his
conduct and demonstrations, was a minute, detailed,
extra-judicial confession by the plaintiff of guilt of the
crime charged. (!S:ee Wharton's C-riminal Evidence, Vol.
2, 11th Ed., par. ·579, 582; see also s~TATE v. MASATO
KARUMAI, 101 Utah 592, at 601, 126 P .. 2d 1047, wherein the court stated : ''A covnfess~on is the admission of
guilt by the defenrJa;nt of all the necessary elements of
the crime of w·hich he is charged, includritng the necessary
acts (J!flid intent . ... ") A confession secured under these
circumstances is not freely and voluntarily given, but
rather coerced, and as such is inadmissible as evidence
at the trial of the accused. Desp~ite objection thereto
by counsel (R. 324, 337) for plaintiff, this testimony and
confessions were admitted at the trial of the plaintiff
all to his prejudice and in violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution of the United States and of
the state of Utah. Without the advice of friends., relatives or counsel this young boy was held ·-by the police
and detection officials, held at the pleasure of these officials, denied his constitutional and legal right to a
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sant questioning, and finally to bring the matter to a
proper culn1ination he was taken by these officials,
\vithout any authorization by a court or magistrate over
the alleged route of the crime and an alleged re~enact
Inent secured. It is interesting to note that P. H. Neeley,
County Attorney, 'vho- prepared the case from its inception and "Tho also presented the State~s case at the
preliminary hearing, was called as a witness for~ the
State during the trial and testified concerning the..alleged
re-enactment as follows: (R. 328, 329; A.F 3).

Q. AU right, then what happened?
A. Jf r. Fisher stopped the car and that was on the
south side of the culve.rt that crosses the H oytsville irr'iga.tion canol there where the road _passes o.ver; ~and I
remember the Sheriff of Morgwn County (R. 329) asked
Jfr. Mares if he would get out and Mr. Mares hesitated
at that point and the Sheriff asked· him kindly to get out
and told him: 'SOMETIME YOU WILL HAVE TO
MEET THIS ANYHOW'; and that Mr. Mares got ·~ut
with the Sheriff ·of Morgan County.''
CRI~IINAL

WHARTON'S

EVIDENCE, Vol. 2,
11th Ed. par. 636, reads as follows: ''The admissibility
of a confession is determined, not by the.person·to whom
it is made, but rather, by the manner and circumstances
under which it is p rocur'ed. Hence, a confession is not
ipso facto involuntary and therefore inadmissible if
made to a person in authority. But the trustworthiness
of a confession depends upon the nature of the: induce. ment held out, and the strength of this inducen1ent de1
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p-ends upon the power of the person offering it. Hence,
the class of p·ersons to whom the confession is made is
often an important consideration. It is recognized that
the actual state of relationship between the accused and
the person in apparent authority must always be inquired into with reference to the probable strength of
the inducement. The rule is equally well settled that
even a slight inducement held out by such a p·erson rende·rs the ·confession involuntary because the accused
would have reason to believe that such p·erson is not only
credible, but is in a position to carry the inducement
into effect. ' '
The above quoted statement, made by the Sheriff
of Morgan County, to the accused, certainly lends itself
to the ·construction that here an official of the law, with
apparent authority, is telling this young boy, who has
been stripped of every safeguard provided by the constitution and the law, ''this is w·hat you have to d:o, I
know, for I am am official of the law.'' Confessions and
testimony received under such circumstances are not to
be relied upon and are not admissible evidence. The
United States Supreme Court in ASHCRAFT v. TENN.,
322 U.S. 143, 154 stated: "We think a situation such as
that here shown by u~controverted evidence is so inherently coercive that its very existence is irreconcilable
with the possession of mental freedom by a lone suspect
against whom its full coercive force is brought to bear."
How could a more inherently coercive situation be found
than in the case of the plaintiff-a minor, 18 years old,
held incommunicado without relatives, friends, guardian
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or counsel, denied the ri_ght to a protnpt preliminary
hearing, questioned incessantly by police, sheriffs, county
attorneys, and special agents of the F.B.I., taken on
excursions to perforn1 a re-enactment of the-alleged crime
without any legal authority from court or magistrate,
never advised of his right to counsel during such questioning. Counsel for defendant undoubtedly stresses the
fact that plaintiff did not ask for counsel and did not
want his mother and father to know about his incarceration. ~Ir. P. H. Neeley, county attorney for Summit
County testified as follows:
~ ·I

said; 'Wait a minute, my boy. L.et me get your
parents. Let me get your father and your mother and a
lawyer, a friend. Haven't you somebody~' I said: 'Don't
tell that to me, because I will use it against you;' and he said: 'No' he did not want anybody to know everything about it. He did not want a lawyer. He did not
want his father or mother; and after that he at times
said he did not want them to know a thing about it.
''As I remem?er, on the 22nd of August, against hf,s
will, I wrote to his father and told him the predicam·ent
his son was in." (R. 372, 373).
.

!

.

'

-

It was -only natural that a young boy held on such
a charge would not want anybody and especially his
father and mother to know about· it. Mr. Neeley very
graciously ( ~) wrote to p·laintiff's father, "against his
will,'' on the 22nd of August, 1946, six days after. the
plaintiff had been incarcerated and during which. time
plaintiff had been denied every constitutional and -legal
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right set up for his protection. The diligent endeavors
of the police, detectives, county attorneys and special
agents to protect society from the evils of crime when
measured by constitutional requirements ''smack'' of the
inquisition and not Anglo-American criminal justice.
In connection with the testimony given by P. H.
Neeley, County Attorney, the following should ,be noted:
(AF6)
There were 3'9 members of the panel of prospective
jurors; 4 were excused for cause as active clients of P.
H. Neeley; 3 were excused for cause for reason of fixed
opinions. Of the remaining 32, 26 personally know P. H.
Neeley and 20 of the 26 were former clients of P. H.
Neeley. Of the 12 jurors who were chosen to try the case,
10 were the personal friends of P. H. Neeley and 7 of
the 10 were former clients of P. H. Neeley. The foreman
of the jury was the Bishop of the Church where P. H.
Neeley was a High Priest in the ecclesiastical stake,
which included the esscesiastical ward presided over by
said foreman as the Bishop thereof. That plaintiff's
counsel knew prior to the time that the jury was sworn
that the individual who subsequently became foreman
of the jury was a Bishop in said Church and that P. H.
Neeley was the County Attorney and an active church
man, but neither plaintiff nor his counsel knew at that
time that the State was going to use said County Attorney as its major witness at the trial, the said County
Atto·rney's name not having been endorsed on the information as a witness in accordance with the Statute and
p·ractice in said State.
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PROPOSITION IV. IT IS A VIOLATION OF THE D,UE
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND SECTION
7 ARTICLE I OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH AND
SECTION 105-13-17 UTAH CODE ANN·OTATED, 1943, TO
ADMIT IN EVIDENCE AT THE TRIAL OF THE ACCUSED
CONFESSIONS AND STATEMENTS ELICITED_ FROM THE
ACCUSED DURING ILLEGAL DETENTION DUE TO FAlLURE PROMPTLY TO CARRY A PRISONER BEFORE A
COMMITTING MAGISTRATE.

Section 105-13-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, provides:

''When om, arrest is made without ·a w·arrant by a·
peace ojficer or private person, the pers·on -ar.rest.ed 'YYIJUSt,
without ulrmecessary deZay, be taken to the nearest or
most accessible magistrate in the co'l11nty in which the
arrest is made, and a complaint, stat.ing the charge
against the person mJUSt be made befo·re such magistrate.

"
The plaintiff was arrested on the evening of August
16, 1946, at about 8:30P.M. and booked for investigation.
(AF 2). It was not until the 21st of Au_gust, 1946, that
a criminal complaint was lodged against the plaintiff,
wherein he was charged with murder, and brought: before
the committing magistrate William. H. Chappell, Justice
of the Peace at Coalville, Utah. (AF 4). During this
period of tin1e the plaintiff was held incommunicado,
without the advice of friends, relatives, guardian or
counsel. He was not advised of his right to counseL. He
\vas questioned by the police, county attorneys, sheriffs
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.and sp~ecial agents of the F.B.I. On the 18th of August,
1946, after ap!proximately five hours of questioning, an
alleged confession was dictated hy these two special
agents to the Chief of Police's stenographer and approximately three hours later the plaintiff signed it. ( R. 414;
AF 2). On the 19th of August, 1946, plaintiff was taken
by P. H. Neeley, County Attorney, and other officers
back over the route of the alleged crime. This was done
without an order from a court or magistrate authorizing
such a procedure. (AF 3).
The practice followed by these police officials and
the county attorney is directly in violation of the plain
reading of Se-ction 105-13-17, quoted above. To arrest
I
,
and hold a person on mere suspicion in order to exact
from him in any way possible confessions and testimony
is a violation of the law and the confessions and testimony secured by said procedure is inadmissible a.s evidence at the trial of the accused. Despite objection by
counsel the trial court admitted confessions and statements secured from the plaintiff during this period of
time, which evidence was a substantial factor in his conviction. ( AF 5). ·The p~raotice used to extract confes-sions and statements from 'P'la.intiff should he condemned
by- this court, and it becomes even more repugnant to
the established procedure of criminal justice and the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution of the United States
and the Constitution of the State of Utah when we note
that the police and county attorney were not dealing with
a hardened criminal with a knowledge of criminal pro·cedures, but rather with an eighteen-year-old boy who
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\Ya~

eon1pletely ignorant of his constitutional and legal
rights.
The United States Supreme Court has condemned
such practices in eri1nes tried before the federal courts
as in violation of Rule 3(a) Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A. which provides:
'~ . .\..n

officer making an arrest under a warrant issued
upon a coinplaint. or any person making an arrest without
a warrant shall take the arrested p-erson without unnecessary delay before the nearest available commi~sioner
or before any other nearby officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the United
States. When a person arrested without a warrant is
brought before a commissioner or other officer, a complaint shall be filed forthwith.''
It should be noted that the Federal rule requires
that exactly the same procedure be followed as does the
Utah provision. In the case of UPSHAW v. UNI TED
STArES, 335 U.S. 410, 413, 414, 69 lS,. Ct. 170, 172
(1948) the Supreme Court held that a confession was
inadmissible if made during illegal detention due to failure to p~romptly carry a prisoner before a committing
magistrate as provided by Rule 5 (a) quoted above. The
court stated at page 413: "The Mitchell case, 332 U.S.
at page 68, 64 S. Ct. at page 8~8, however, re-affirms
the 1f.cNahb rule that a confession is inadmissible if
rnade during illegal detention due to failure promptly
to carry a prisoner before a committing magistrate,
1
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whether or not the 'oonfession is the result of tortu;re,
physical or psychalogic:a.l' ... ''
Page 14: "In this case we are left in no doubt as
to why this petitioner was not brought promptly before
a ~ommitting magistrate. The arresting officer himself
stated that p·etitioner was not ·carried before a magistrate
on Friday or Saturday morning after his arrest on
Friday at 2 :00 A.M., because the officer thought there
was 'not sufficient case' for the court to hold him, adding that even 'if the police court did hold him we would
lose custody of him and I no longer would be able to
question him.' Thus the arresting officer in effect conceded that the confessions here were 'the fruits of
wrongdoing' by the police officer. He conceded more:
He admitted that petitioner was illegally detained for at
least thirty hours for the very purpose of securing these
challenged confessions. He thereby refutes any possibility of an argument that after arrest he was carried
before a magistrate 'without unnecessary delay.' "
Plaintiff contends that the delay of five days before
taking him before a committing magistrate was unreasonable and in violation of the law, and certainly the
only assumption that can be made from all the attendant
circumstances is that; ''plaintiff was not taken before
a magistrate until the police, county attorneys, etc.
could force statements and confessions from plaintiff
sufficient to convict him of the crime of 1nurder in the
·first degree.'' '· Any other conclusion would not be in
accordance with the undisputed facts.
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The Utah la'v specifically required that plaintiff be
taken 'vithout unnecessary delay before the nearest magistrate and a con1plaint tiled. In violating this right,
the plaintiff "?as denied due process of law as require·d
by the 14th Alnendrnent of the Constitution of the United
States and Section 7, Article I of the Constitution of the
State of Utah. The very essence of due process required
that appropriate procedure be followed before liberty
is curtailed or life is taken. The United States ·S,upreme
ATTS v. STATE OF INDIANA, 338 U.S.
Court in
49, 69 S. Ct. 1347 (1949) stated at page 55: "In holding
that the Due Process Clause bars police procedure which
violates the basic notions of our accusatorial mode of
prosecuting crime and vitiates a conviction based on the
fruits of such 'procedure, we apply the Due Process
Clause to its historic function of assuring appropriate
procedure before liberty is curtailed or life is taken."

''T

Further argument pertinent to the constitutional
questions raised in the proposition have been sufficiently
set out in the first thre~ propositions and reference is
made thereto.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion plaintiff states that the Due Pr~ocess
Clause of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States and Section 7 of Article I of the Constitution of Utah and Section 105-13-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, are all violated when the police take into
custody an 18 year old minor accused of murder, hold
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him for 12 days without a preliminary hearing, during
said period of time question him intensely at various
times, and for five hours straight prior to obtaining a
purported confession from him; stage a purported reenactment of the crime without a court order three days
after the accused had been arrested and while he was
still being held by police and detection officials without
the assistance of counsel, relatives, guardians or friends;
fail to furnish said minor who was accused of a eapital
offense the aid of ·counsel, or to inform him of his right
to counsel during his incarceration from the time he was
arrested until the preliminary hearing; and fail to take
said minor, without unnecessary delay to the nearest or
most accessible magistrate in the court in which the
arrest was made, and a complaint stating the charge
against said minor be made before such magistrate.
Plaintiff submits that all the evidence obtained under
these circumstances was inadmissible at the trial of said ·
minor for murder. Despite objection thereto, the. court
allowed such evidence to ·be admitted, thereby violating
plaintiff's ·constitutional rights as hereinabove set forth.
Therefore, the judgment of the court convicting plaintiff
of murder in the first degree should be set aside.
Respectfully submitted,
McCULLOUGH, BOYCE & McCUI_JLOUGH
Att~orneys

for Plaintiff ,
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